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Abstract
Why do ecologists aim to get positive results? Once again, negative results are necessary for better knowledge 
accumulation.— Hypothesis testing is commonly used in ecology and conservation biology as a tool to test sta-
tistical–population parameter properties against null hypotheses. This tool was first invented by lab biologists and 
statisticians to deal with experimental data for which the magnitude of biologically relevant effects was known 
beforehand. The latter often makes the use of this tool inadequate in ecology because we field ecologists usually 
deal with observational data and seldom know the magnitude of biologically relevant effects. This precludes us 
from using hypothesis testing in the correct way, which is posing informed null hypotheses and making use of 
a priori power tests to calculate necessary sample sizes, and it forces us to use null hypotheses of equality to 
zero effects which are of little use for field ecologists because we know beforehand that zero effects do not exist 
in nature. This is why only 'positive' (statistically significant) results are sought by ecologists, because negative 
results always derive from a lack of power to detect small (usually biologically irrelevant) effects. Despite this, 
'negative' results should be published, as they are important within the context of meta–analysis (which accounts 
for uncertainty when weighting individual studies by sample size) to allow proper decision–making. The use of 
multiple hypothesis testing and Bayesian statistics puts an end to this black or white dichotomy and moves us 
towards a more realistic continuum of grey tones.
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Resumen
¿Por qué los ecólogos desean obtener resultados positivos? Una vez más, los resultados negativos son necesarios 
para mejorar la acumulación de conocimiento.— El contraste de hipótesis se emplea habitualmente en ecología y 
biología de la conservación como una herramienta para contrastar los valores de los parámetros de poblaciones 
estadísticas con las hipótesis nulas. Esta herramienta fue inventada por biólogos de laboratorio y estadísticos para 
tratar datos experimentales para los que se conocía de antemano la magnitud de los efectos biológicamente rel-
evantes. Esto hace que a menudo en ecología no sea adecuado utilizar esta herramienta porque los ecólogos de 
campo generalmente trabajamos con datos observacionales y rara vez conocemos la magnitud de los efectos que 
son biológicamente relevantes. Ello nos impide usar el contraste de hipótesis adecuadamente, es decir, plantear 
hipótesis nulas que contengan información y emplear pruebas de potencia a priori para calcular los tamaños de 
muestra necesarios, y nos fuerza a emplear hipótesis nulas de efectos iguales a cero que son de poca utilidad para 
los ecólogos de campo porque sabemos por adelantado que en la naturaleza los efectos siempre son distintos de 
cero. Por esto los ecólogos siempre desean encontrar resultados positivos (estadísticamente significativos), porque 
los negativos siempre proceden de una falta de potencia para detectar efectos pequeños, que por lo general son 
biológicamente irrelevantes. A pesar de ello, los resultados negativos deberían publicarse porque son importantes en 
el contexto de los metanálisis (que analizan la incertidumbre al ponderar distintos estudios en función del tamaño de 
muestra) para permitir una adecuada toma de decisiones. El uso del contraste múltiple de hipótesis y la estadística 
bayesiana acaba con esta dicotomía, y nos sitúa en un contexto más realista en el que existe una escala de grises. 
Palabras claves: Pruebas de potencia, Resultados negativos, Magnitud del efecto, Resultados positivos, Datos 
observacionales, Contraste de hipótesis nulas.
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It is well known that citation rates of ecological 
papers are affected by the direction of the study 
outcome with respect to the hypothesis tested, with 
supportive papers being more frequently cited than 
unsupportive papers (Leimu & Koricheva, 2005). In 
part because of this, it is difficult to publish a result of 
our research which turns out to be negative (defining 
negative as ‘statistically non–significant’) (Dickersin 
et al., 1992), or at least to publish it in a journal with 
a high impact factor (Koricheva, 2003). But there is 
more than this behind our reluctance to publish and 
cite negative results.
Why do we aim to get positive results?
Frequentist inferential statistics is a tool developed 
by and for laboratory people (notably Fisher, Neyman 
and Pearson) in the 1930s. It was created as a forced 
alternative to already existing Bayesian statistics be-
cause at that time it was difficult to solve the integrals 
needed to estimate the denominator of Bayes’ formula 
(i.e. the probability of obtaining our data). Lab people 
—including all sorts of experimentalists in the life 
sciences and other sciences— have a huge advantage 
over field ecologists. Before starting an experiment, 
they often know which magnitude of effect is biologi-
cally relevant for them. On the contrary, we ecologists 
most often do not. I like to call this the 'Gordian knot' 
of ecological statistics. Hence we have borrowed an 
analytical framework that is not particularly appropriate 
for us, most often owners of observational rather than 
experimental data. When we know the magnitude of 
an effect that is of interest for our question we can 
use hypothesis–testing correctly, by making use of a 
priori power tests. These tests allow us to calculate the 
sample size required to obtain a statistically significant 
result only for a biologically relevant magnitude of the 
effect. For example, when comparing the length of the 
wings of two migratory moth populations to evaluate 
their potential as migrants we would only say that diffe-
rences are statistically significant (that is, there is little 
or no overlap between the 95% confidence intervals of 
the point estimates of wing length of both populations) 
when they differ in at least 'x' millimetres if we knew 
beforehand that only beyond that difference level (i.e. 
effect size) a relevant biological phenomenon occurs. 
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In this case, our null hypothesis would not be equal to 
zero but equal to 'x'. But the problem is that we seldom 
(not to say 'never') know the magnitude of interest of 
our differences in ecology. And hence we end up tes-
ting uninformative null hypotheses (of equality to zero 
effects) and thus do not make use of informed a priori 
power tests. Hence it is not that ecologists necessarily 
make poor use of hypothesis testing; it is that we cannot 
do better with a tool that does not belong to us, as if 
we were trying to paint a wall with a brush designed 
to paint a canvas. The drawback of not being able to 
use a priori power tests to obtain the required size of 
samples to test for a biologically meaningful effect is 
that we use hypothesis testing blindly. We commonly 
collect data with a fairly small sample size (e.g. n = 30) 
and hope to reach conclusions. We reason, correctly, 
that if we are able to obtain positive ('statistically signi-
ficant') results with such a small sample size, we can 
be quite confident that we have found a large effect, 
most likely a biologically relevant one. This is because 
small effects require a large sample size to be detec-
ted. Hence, it is also true that if we are using a large 
sample size to reach statistical significance we will 
certainly be able to do so even for tiny effects, which 
will often be biologically irrelevant. But this situation of 
getting into trouble for having 'too much' sample size 
is much less common in ecology (although it can also 
happen when pooling large data sets), except perhaps 
for theoretical ecologists, who can make use of huge 
sample sizes when using simulated data. If, on the 
contrary, without using a priori power tests, we find a 
negative result —that is, we have a P–value higher than 
the a priori agreed alpha risk of being wrong— we can 
only say that we have had a lack–of–power problem, 
something that both authors and journal editors dislike. 
This is so because by increasing the sample size we 
would always obtain a statistically significant result in 
the end, when our null hypotheses are of equality to 
zero effects, because there are always some effects or 
differences in nature due to natural variability between 
individuals and populations. Two populations may differ 
in a tiny amount only, but they do differ in some of their 
decimal points (Martínez–Abraín, 2007). If we have not 
found that difference it is just because of a low ability of 
our 'magnifying lens' (determined by our sample size) 
to do so. That seemingly makes our negative results 
not appealing for publication. 
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Negative results, however, are informative if we pay 
attention to sample size. A negative result obtained 
using a small sample size probably means that the 
effect we are studying is medium or small but not large. 
A negative result associated with a large sample size 
necessarily means that our biological effect is tiny. 
Negative results are indeed most informative when we 
have previously used a priori power tests but, I insist, 
it is not the ecologist’s fault not to be able to do so. 
It is something inherent to our observational science 
not to know beforehand in most cases the magnitude 
of an effect that is relevant for our questions. 
The use of alternative methods of data analysis, 
such as the simultaneous testing of multiple (sensical) 
hypotheses with selection of the most parsimonious 
models (representing hypotheses in mathematical 
format) by means of numerical criteria based on 
the loss of theoretical Kullback–Leibler information 
(Burnham & Anderson, 2002; Anderson, 2008), is a 
step forward that is increasingly gaining relevance in 
ecology. Obviously, this is a much better approach 
than testing a null hypothesis containing nil information 
against a unique alternative hypothesis which points 
by force in opposite direction of the null and for which 
we present no evidence whatsoever. 
Importantly, the use of Bayesian statistics may 
also help us to put an end to this old debate because 
we obtain the posterior distribution of the population 
parameter (given our data), thanks to combining the 
data–derived likelihood of the parameter with prior 
information on the parameter (or with a flat prior 
distribution if previous information is not available) by 
means of Bayes’ rule; the advantage, anyway, is that 
we can interrogate the posterior distribution not only 
about the probability of our parameter being equal to 
a small range of values including zero, but about the 
probability of our parameter being within any other in-
terval of interest representing an area delimited by the 
posterior probability density function (Kéry, 2010; Kéry 
& Schaub, 2012). This way, the dichotomy between 
positive and negative results associated to classical 
hypothesis testing vanishes. Bayesian statistics, with 
all its particular drawbacks are, in this sense, more 
appropriate for the field ecologist and her/his battery 
of observational data.
So, are negative results of any use?
All of this does not imply that our negative results 
are not useful and that they should not be published. 
There is good information in each study that can be 
taken advantage of by means of meta–analysis (Bo-
renstein et al., 2009). Means and standard deviations 
are valuable information, when duly weighted by 
sample size to obtain overall effect sizes (Gurevitch 
& Hedges, 2001). These overall effect sizes are in 
turn useful to break the undesirable situation of not 
having an a priori idea of the effect expected to be 
relevant in our studies, and hence they are useful to 
make use of statistical inference by hypothesis testing 
in the right way, which is using a priori power tests to 
calculate required sample sizes to couple biological 
and statistical significance (Martínez–Abraín, 2008) or 
using them as prior information in Bayesian analyses. 
In addition, publishing negative results (abundant in 
the grey literature) helps prevent publication bias in 
meta–analysis, a common problem when trying to 
synthesize knowledge quantitatively in an unbiased 
way (Møller & Jennions, 2001), and basic for proper 
decision–making in applied ecology (Stewart, 2010). 
Publication bias arises because studies with larger 
effect sizes are more likely to be statistically significant 
(positive) for any given sample size, and hence larger 
effects are more likely to be published, leading to over-
estimation of the true overall effect (Borenstein et al., 
2009). As Scargle (2000) stated, 'apparently significant, 
but actually spurious, results can arise from publica-
tion bias, with only a modest number of unpublished 
studies and hence, statistical combinations of studies 
from the literature can be trusted to be unbiased only 
if there is reason to believe that there are essentially 
no unpublished studies (almost never the case!)'. Pre-
venting this, by publishing negative results, is especially 
relevant in times of ecological and economic crisis as 
currently prevail.
Final remarks
Developing journals that promote publication of nega-
tive results (such as the Journal of Negative Results 
of the University of Helsinki http://www.zoominfo.com/
company/Journal+of+Negative+Results–354476827 
or the initiatives by the Centre for Evidence–Based 
Conservation at Bangor University http://www.cebc.
bangor.ac.uk/ together with Cambridge University 
http://www.conservationevidence.com/) to publish and 
synthesize grey literature) is a fundamental step to 
improve knowledge accumulation in applied ecology. 
Additionally, the recent expansion among ecologists of 
model selection by means of information criteria and 
Bayesian statistics (see e.g. Halstead et al., 2012), as 
enabled by modern computers, will contribute to ending 
this conundrum, because results are not classified in 
a dichotomous way around an arbitrary a priori risk 
level of being wrong (alpha) but in a continuous way. 
Hopefully, we will see this old debate around positive 
and negative results die in the near future. This will 
translate into better decision–making in fields such as 
applied conservation biology. With a focus on simul-
taneous multiple hypothesis testing and effect sizes, 
black or white debates will be substituted by a scale 
of greys, better representing what really occurs out 
there in the complex world of Earth´s ecosystems. 
Meanwhile, let’s not discard negative results, because 
we need to extract as much information as possible 
from our costly data.
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